

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

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CUVÂNT ÎNAINTE

Volumul *Political Communication*, datorat cercetătoarelor și profesoarelor Antonia Enache și Marina Militaru, se impune pe piața românească a cărților din domeniul comunicării politice drept studiu necesar îmbogățirii literaturii de specialitate, destinat cititorilor avizați, și interesați de științele comunicării, de științele politice, sau de analiza discursului.

Este neîndoielnic că sinteza abordărilor teoretice ale comunicării politice, ca, de altfel, și confruntarea acestora cu realitatea practicilor politice constituie elemente apreciable ale noutății demersului științific propus.

Lucrarea este structurată pe două secțiuni principale. *Partea I* este dedicată cu precădere analizei discursului politic, din perspectiva limbajului și a strategiilor discursive specifice. Autoarele își încep cercetarea cu prezentarea semnificațiilor conceptelor de *democrație* și *putere*, fundamental asociate regimurilor democratice și prin urmare, comunicării promovate în interiorul acestora. În cel de-al doilea capitol al primei părți, se aprofundează fenomenul *comunicării*, prin aducerea în discuție a unor aspecte referitoare la *propagandă* și *discurs*. De asemenea, sunt analizați factorii semnificativi pentru comunicarea politică, precum principalii actori implicați în proces, canalele de comunicare și mediul specific dezvoltării acestei căi de relaționare interumană. Capitolul se încheie cu prezentarea succintă a modalităților și a tendințelor dezvoltării comunicării politice.

Strategia discursivă a *promisiunii* face obiectul celui de-al treilea capitol al primei părți a volumului, dată fiind contiguitatea sa cu comunicarea în arena politică: orice aspirant la o funcție publică își construiește discursul pe fundamentul unor acte promisiive. În analiza lor, doamnele Antonia Enache și Marina Militaru accentuează factorii psihologici care sub-întind promisiunea, tipurile de promisiuni recurente în contextul politic, ca și particularitățile promisiunii politice; în segmentul final al capitolului, cele două cercetătoare își propun să lămurească una dintre întrebările legitime, frecvente în rândul potențialilor electori, și anume: poate fi etichetat drept mincinos un politician care nu și-a dus la îndeplinire o promisiune?

Strategiile discursive utilizate de către politicieni în cadrul dezbaterilor electorale televizate, tratate în capitolul al patrulea, sunt subsumate următoarelor categorii evaluative (vezi Chilton și Van Dijk): strategii *pozitive*, prin intermediul cărora un vorbitor, actor politic, își legitimează discursul prin invocarea propriilor realizări, strategii *negative*, actualizate de atacurile verbale contra adversarului politic principal și strategii *"neutre"*,

prin care vorbitorul încearcă să persuadeze electoratul (actorul implicit al comunicării politice), prin trezirea unor reacții emoționale ale opiniei publice (pathosul aristotelic).

Capitolul al cincilea prezintă cititorilor ipostaze ale comunicării politice în care vorbitorul include în discursul său persuasiv referiri la religie, iar capitolul al șaselea expune mijloacele moderne ale propagandei, și anume comunicarea politică pe internet, prin intermediul paginilor web personale ale politicienilor, al blogurilor și al rețelelor sociale. Ultimul capitol al *Părții I* compară discursul politic cu cel comercial, concluzia inerentă fiind că se constată asemănări notabile între strategiile persuasive comune ambelor tipuri de comunicare.

Merită subliniat faptul că fiecare capitol este urmat de un *Practice file*, o serie de ilustrări destinate studiului individual. *Corpus*-ul primei părți a lucrării conține exemple de discurs politic și comercial extrase din diferite (con)texte, din diverse țări și culturi, tocmai în încercarea autoarelor de a dovedi că normele comunicării politice sunt esențialmente aceleași, în aproape orice context, în ciuda variațiilor particularizante.

A doua parte a volumului *Political Communication* este dedicată studiului *comunicării non-verbale*, sau *discursului mut* al politicienilor. Astfel, autoarele transcend analitic limitele discursului vorbit și al înțelesului cuvintelor, pentru a pătrunde implicațiile mesajelor comunicate printr-un canal diferit de cel verbal.

În primul capitol al părții secunde, se explică pe larg sensurile comunicării non-verbale, iar, în continuare, sunt analizate și ierarhizate funcțiile acestui tip de comunicare. În egală măsură, autoarele reliefează rolul gesturilor semnificative care acompaniază discursul verbal, precum și tipologia gesturilor. Capitolul al doilea se ocupă de *mișcările corporale* care scot la iveală starea afectivă sau emoțională a vorbitorului, actorului politic, în cazul nostru. Analiza atitudinii corporale dezvăluie o gamă amplă de stări și intenții ale comunicatorului: de teamă, de deschidere față de interlocutor, de agresivitate, de cooperare, de frustrare, de așteptare, de nervozitate, de acceptare etc. Autoarele nu neglijează nici implicațiile comunicative ale tonului vocii sau ale pauzelor în cadrul comunicării verbale.

Următorul capitol al volumului *Political Communication (Partea a doua)* abordează problematica *reclamei politice televizate*. La începutul argumentării, sunt evocate caracteristicile reclamei politice, în general, funcțiile acesteia (de informare, de persuadare și de îmbălsăvire a memoriei), canalele prin care este distribuită reclama politică, ca și eficacitatea spoturilor politice televizate și a imaginii vizuale în reclama politică. Partea finală a capitolului menționat prezintă tipurile și funcțiile reclamei politice televizate.

Corpusul *Părții a II-a* este alcătuit dintr-o serie amplă de imagini din spațiul politic autohton și din cel mondial, care înfățișează politicieni binecunoscuți publicului, în diferite ipostaze menite să suscite interesul opiniei publice.

În consecință, sinteza abordărilor comunicării politice, la care ne-am referit mai sus, permite cititorilor să confrunte tratarea teoretică a comunicării politice cu realitatea concretă, istorică pe care fiecare națiune o trăiește nemijlocit, cu ocazia evenimentelor politice care se finalizează cu opțiunea publicului pentru anumite politici, în detrimentul altora. Politicile votate modifică, pe termen lung, existența națiunii, în plan social, moral, economic, cultural etc. În istoria ultimilor ani, criza economică intervenită în anul 2008 se impune ca un astfel de eveniment de anvergură mondială, care a dus la profunde schimbări structurale resimțite de societățile democratice.

Această confruntare între aspectul teoretic și cel practic al contingentului, în domeniul comunicării politice, generează conturarea și clarificarea unor reacții politice, de ambele părți ale baricadei. Cu alte cuvinte, atât politicianul (omul de stat) – agentul comunicării politice, cât și cetățeanul de rând (potențialul votant) – destinatarul mesajelor, se constituie în coparticipanți la jocul politic.

Mai concret spus, electorului condamnat la o atitudine quasi pasivă după vot, i se deschide perspectiva adoptării unor reacții, a unei poziționări active: aceea de a-l trage la răspundere pe cel pe care l-a votat pentru acțiunile sale, pentru modul în care (nu) i-a reprezentat interesele, pentru faptul că nu și-a îndeplinit promisiunile, sau le-a îndeplinit doar parțial. Conștientizarea dreptului la reacție ne face pe noi, cetățenii obișnuiți, mai lucizi, mai activi, și mai responsabili în relația cu politicul și cu societatea, în general. În mod complementar, omului politic i se deschide perspectiva de a-și asuma cu adevărat și pe deplin promisiunile făcute.

Nu în ultimul rând, merită remarcat faptul că studiul doamnelor Antonia Enache și Marina Militaru este susținut de remarcabile surse bibliografice, ceea ce îl recomandă drept lucrare științifică de referință. Pe de altă parte, *Political Communication* invită cititorii, în calitate de votanți, la o abordare mai responsabilă a jocului comunicării, mai ales al celei politice. Actualitatea acestei invitații este, după părerea noastră, cu atât mai evidentă, cu cât în momentul de față, lumea în general, și România, în special, trec printr-o serie de probleme politice acute, cu consecințe și implicații directe și dureroase pentru viața individului.

Conf. univ. dr. Ruxandra Boicu

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION – PART 1

Introduction

The main purpose our paper, *Political Communication – Part 1*, is to provide an introduction to the domain of political communication in democratic regimes. For our purpose, we have decided to analyze some crucial concepts in the domain of political communication. Among these, we shall now mention the notions of democracy and power, the general characteristics of political discourse, the most important strategies employed by politicians in order to obtain electors' votes, the concept of propaganda and its implications, the political promise, discourse strategies in the case of televised debates, the modern trends in political discourse, the modern means of communication in politics, via the internet: the personal website, blogging, and social networking, and the appeal to religion in political communication. The final section of *Part 1* will provide a brief analysis of the similarities between political and commercial advertising.

Each Chapter is followed by a Practice Sheet providing examples for discussion in the classroom or for individual study. The corpus of *Political Communication – Part 1* includes extracts from political speeches delivered in Romania, the USA and France between 1996 and 2012. We have included televised debates between Presidential candidates, instances of electoral discourse, and also excerpts taken from the personal web-pages of various politicians. In the last chapter, the Practice Sheet includes a number of political and commercial slogans from various countries and periods of time. By using a wide array of extracts, we hope to show that the features we have attempted to highlight may occur in any country, irrespective of its past or cultural tradition, provided that the present regime can be called a democratic one.

Our study is by no means exhaustive, nor does it claim to answer all the questions related to political communication or to supply an all-encompassing analysis. We have merely attempted to highlight some of the aspects that recur in many instances of political communication, in various countries, in various contexts. We have looked into the aspects that appear repeatedly, with a view to shedding light on them, and leaving room for much further research.

1. DEMOCRACY AND POWER

General remarks on the concepts of democracy and power. Introductory remarks

In modern times, political communication goes hand in hand with the idea of democracy; therefore, we cannot tackle the subject at stake without attempting an insight into the concept of democracy, analyzing the definition and implications that best suit our needs. Moreover, in the study of political communication, power is paramount, since access to power and all related benefits is what politicians are after in elections campaigns.

Thus, for the purpose of our paper, in this first section we shall focus on the concepts of democracy and power and on the elements we consider relevant for our subsequent analysis. Among these, we shall speak about the common good, the general will, the sovereignty of the people, political equality, political liberty and the important actors in political communication.

1.1. Elements of *democracy*

The origins of the idea of democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece. The Greek root of the word is composed of *demos* (meaning *people*) and *kratein* (meaning *to lead*). Thus, the main idea behind the emerging concept is that of self-government by the many, as opposed to the few (oligarchy), or to only one person (dictatorship). A similar definition is provided by Abraham Lincoln (government of the people, by the people, for the people¹). Therefore, from the very beginning, the people were envisaged as both the main actor and the main beneficiary of this system of governance.

Subsequently, the first differentiation that ensues is that between direct and representative democracy. For the citizens of ancient Greece, democracy meant leadership by common men, directly exercised in open gatherings, which implied open debates and decisions. Generally speaking, in a direct democracy, **all** citizens are expected to meet regularly in order to debate topical issues and decide on situations affecting their lives.

Such a system was functional in the 5th century B.C., in Athens, a city-state restricted enough for all male citizens to be able to meet in public assemblies. Obviously though, a direct democracy with everyone's participation is only possible in restricted communities, where citizens also

¹ <http://www.democracy-building.info/definition-democracy.html>

have enough spare time. Also, we can say that direct democracy comes closest to the utopian model of classical democracy.

By contrast, when we take into consideration the modern state, we speak about an extended, populated community in which most of the citizens lack the time necessary to constantly get involved in public assemblies; therefore, we are now dealing with a representative democracy – a system where citizens elect a few people to represent them and act on their behalf.

There are three elements characteristic of a *representative democracy*:

1. **The sovereignty of the people** – namely, the principle that the people represent the main source of public authority. This tenet reenacts JJ Rousseau’s notion of *general will* – it is assumed that people take effective part in political processes, while the policies of the Government and Parliament reflect the will of the majority.
2. **Political equality** – the second fundamental principle of democracy, says that each person is equally important in the process of voting or in making other political decisions. Thus, according to Aristotle, but also to Thomas Jefferson, the ideal society to “practice” democracy is one formed of a strong middle-class, whose wealth is a direct consequence of a justly distributed private property; thus, both the dangers of a wealthy, dominant and arrogant middle class and of a discontent, poor and dangerous low class would be eliminated.
3. **Political liberty** refers to the fact that, in a democracy, citizens are protected from the government’s interference in the exertion of their fundamental liberties, such as the freedom of expression, the freedom of religion, the freedom of thought, the freedom of belief, the freedom of peaceful assembly, and the freedom of association.

1.2. Elements of *power*

We cannot separate the concept of democracy from the concept of power, since they appear to be strongly intertwined and to influence each other’s course. From the very beginning, democracy appears to be a twofold concept; in *Politeia*, Plato puts forward the dual nature of democracy, where democracy by consent appears to be less damaging than democracy by

violence². The phrasing itself testifies to the fact that, although far from perfect, the democratic system of government appears to be the least harmful of all.

Nowadays, the British linguist Norman Fairclough also presents a slightly different version of this dichotomy. He claims that there are two essential ways in which someone can keep and exercise power: either by forcing people to submit, under threat of the supreme punishment of physical violence and death, or by obtaining people's consent, albeit a reluctant one, to the perpetrator's holding and exerting power. Briefly speaking, power can be wielded by coercion or by consent.

In practice, coercion and consent do not appear independently; they can overlap to a certain extent, but one of them always overrides the other³.

The author considers power by consent to be preferable and superior to power by coercion, since the underlying mechanism behind the latter is force, whereas the key concept in the former is ideology. Logically speaking, ideology (power of the mind) appears to be superior to force (physical strength).

Since coercion appears to be related to physical force, while consent appears to be related to moral authority, we can justly say that argumentation (an underlying concept of persuasion) and the possibility of an option exist only in the latter situation. Subsequently, we cannot imagine the relevance and necessity of a promise, in a context where there is no option and rules are brutally enforced.

The dichotomy in question seems to have been a major concern with writers of all times. Hannah Arendt, for instance, differentiates between authority and force, remarking that, since authority always requires submission, it is usually wrongly interpreted as a form of violence. However, authority eliminates the use of proper means of constraint; where force needs to be used, authority in itself has failed⁴. Therefore, in Arendt's vision, the concept of authority closely resembles what Fairclough has in mind when he describes power by consent. The dichotomy *power of the mind* versus *physical strength*, originating in Plato's work, recurs in the writings of these two authors as well.

However, we cannot say that the two notions are similar, since in Arendt's view, authority is not compatible with persuasion; persuasion presupposes equality and operates by means of a process of argumentation.

² Simone Goyard – Fabre, 1998, *Qu'est-ce que la démocratie ? – La généalogie philosophique d'une grande aventure humaine*, Armand Colin, Paris, p. 27.

³ Norman Fairclough, 1989, *Language and Power*, Longman, London and New York, p. 33.

⁴ Hannah Arendt, 1997: *Între trecut și viitor – Opt exerciții de gândire politică*, Editura Antet, Prahova, Traducere de Louis Rinaldo Ulrich, p. 99.

By contrast, persuasion is a key factor in our approach, since we cannot speak of political discourse and exclude argumentation and persuasion. In the process of political communication, the speaker (potential candidate) establishes a relationship of equality with his interlocutor (the potential elector), even if his current hierarchical position is a superior one, and he could be said to have authority over the listener. The speaker resorts to the strategies of *persuasion*, which means that his authority is temporarily put on hold.

As a final remark on the distinction *coercion – consent*, we can say that the former is characteristic of democratic regimes, while the latter is characteristic of totalitarian regimes (either right or left-oriented). This distinction becomes extremely obvious at the level of discourse.

1.3. From democracy to power

At first sight, democracy appears in a favourable, hope-generating light. Democracy seems opposed to tyranny, constructed on the solid rule of law, on the idea of Citizenship and the Constitution, the supreme law in any state. However, criticism emerges starting with Plato, who condemns the harmful effects of domination over other people, and with Aristotle, who considers the democratic model to be far from the model of the ideal state⁵. Today, the buzz-word is *tyranny of the majority*, threatening both individual freedom and the freedom of minority groups⁶.

Is democracy therefore good or bad? Is it a utopia, a myth, or is it a realistic system whose implementation has yet to reach perfection?

Indeed, the sovereignty of the people is an abstract principle, something that does not exist in itself, for several reasons, the most important of which seems to be the random, fallible nature of representation⁷. Political leaders are far from perfect, often motivated by hidden agendas, including numerous ulterior motives, from material interests to pure ego.

Also, people may well be labelled as irrational and incompetent⁸. Average citizens may be poorly informed, unstable, unwilling to get involved, or simply lacking an interest in the unfolding of political processes. Thus, it has repeatedly been stated that our representatives should not let public opinion influence them. Also, people in general may be

⁵ Simone Goyard-Fabre, *op. cit.*, p.44.

⁶ Edward S. Greenberg, and Benjamin I. Page, 1999: *The Struggle for Democracy*, Longman, New York, pp. 12-15.

⁷ Lucian Boia, 2003: *Mitul democrației*, Editura Humanitas, București.

⁸ Edward S. Greenberg, and Benjamin I. Page, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

irrational, letting themselves be driven by emotions rather than by reason. We tend to vote for a person instead of an idea or a doctrine, and in doing so, we manifest ourselves as emotional rather than rational entities.

However, the most important reason why democracy distances itself from the ideal pertains not to the electors, but to the elected. Normally, candidates running for public office are rarely angels motivated by the abstract desire to serve the common or general good; their objectives appear as more personal and concrete. First on their list is power, a fundamental concept in politics. Harold Lasswell described power as who gets what, when, and how⁹. Therefore, access to power brings along a number of personal advantages, mainly financial, plus the ability to influence events, as well as other people's lives, according to one's own desires.

Although this outlook on democracy appears to be rather pessimistic, this should not affect our opinion that it represents, if not the best system of governance, at least the least harmful to its citizens. The cases when its alternatives were implemented (whether right-oriented or left-oriented dictatorships) can only support this view.

This is true at least because, in this type of regime, the guiding rules, although imperfect, are accepted by all participants involved. This cannot be said of any totalitarian regime, where the underlying rule, that of physical force, excludes agreement from most participants. In other words, in a democracy, we are dealing with power by consent, which therefore enjoys **legitimacy**. This legitimacy involves more than a mere commitment to democracy regarded as an abstract concept; it involves strong adherence to the rules and regulations of the constitutional system of a country. In consolidated democracies there can be conflict; however, at least in theory, important social or political actors do not try to attain their objectives by illegal, unconstitutional or antidemocratic means. Therefore, in spite of potential disapproval of governmental policies, the elites as well as public opinion strongly consider that the respective institutions and procedures are best for collective governance¹⁰.

In spite of any drawbacks, however, the Western world with all its values (democracy, technological advances, the existence of fundamental rights and freedoms, institutional efficiency) remains the icon of a society that works better than any of its alternatives.

⁹ Thomas E. Patterson, 1996: *The American Democracy*, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., New York, p. 16.

¹⁰ Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, Hung-mao Tien, 2004: *Cum se consolidează democrația*, Editura Polirom - Collegium, Iași, București, p.20.

Above and beyond everything else, democracy can be described as a system that works. It is not perfect, but it can function within normal parametres.

If democracy in itself is perfectly acceptable, it may be the wrong ideas we have about it that make it function deficiently¹¹. It may be that the expectations we have from this system of governance are too high. Naturally, what a democracy actually is (the real situation) cannot be separated from what a democracy should ideally be (the utopian situation). However, we can ask ourselves whether this is the only case where expectations fall short of reality. This does not seem to be the case. Quite the opposite, there are many situations in which we cannot reach the ideal we are aiming at; still, once we give up on the ideal, we also give up on the struggle, on our hope for the better.

Consequently, defining democracy acquires a two-fold dimension: there is a *descriptive* dimension, as well as a *prescriptive* one. These two sides are closely intertwined and they cannot exist without each other. We have to keep in mind the fact that, on the one hand, the democratic ideal does not describe the reality of democracy and, on the other hand, real democracy is shaped by the constant interaction between ideal and reality¹².

We can conclude this section of our discussion by quoting Winston Churchill's famous remark: *No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time*¹³.

1.4. Political communication in democratic regimes

As we have already mentioned, the most appropriate and natural framework for political communication (with all its implications: argumentation, the possibility of choice, and the necessity of making promises) is the democratic one. Therefore, a real political promise (namely one made to an audience that has, to a certain extent, the possibility of choosing), relies, at least theoretically, on two factors:

1. The existence of **an agreement** (expressed or implied), between speaker and audience, on a certain common good (described as something that is good for the majority of people involved);

¹¹ Giovanni Sartori, 1999: *Teoria democrației reinterpretată*, Editura Polirom - Collegium, Iași, București, p.31.

¹² *Id.*

¹³ <http://www.123helpme.com/view.asp?id=133355>

2. A **democratic framework**, necessary for a promise to function in its normal parametres.

If we take a closer look at these two factors, we see that the former pertains to the classical theory of democracy. Still, it is hard to apply to modern contexts, as it contains an inherent contradiction: the very people proclaiming this abstract “common good” then prompt us to understand it as an individual good.

Individualism and democracy, the main pillars of the American system, come into conflict, since democracy represents a state of affairs dedicated to the common good, while individualism can only be understood as a way of pursuing your own, personal well-being. How can they co-exist?

There appears to be an incompatibility between democracy as a system of government by the people (therefore dedicated to the common good) and individualism, as a system of going after your own, personal good.

Individualism has taken shape as a doctrine originating in the American dream (youth, beauty, wealth) and in the myth of the Elect, while democracy is by definition centred on the community. Democracy is a political concept made famous by Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence¹⁴, which stipulates its values: equality by birth, the right to life and freedom, and the pursuit of happiness – with this last point, we already find ourselves in slippery waters, since happiness in itself is a concept pertaining to individualism.

Therefore, the common good and the individual good appear to be in conflict. The classic case of contradiction ensues when the common good is invoked by politicians in order to require sacrifice from citizens – situations where this may happen are very diverse, from the case of an armed conflict (where the common good requires you, the individual, to go to war and die, if you have to, for a higher ideal) to the present situation of the economic crisis, where lay-offs are seen as natural, and you are required to willingly give up on your job (which ensures survival for yourself and your family) for the company not to go bankrupt, or for the economy as a whole to survive; therefore, it quickly becomes obvious that the individual and the common good often contradict each other, in spite of JJ Rousseau’s opinion that they are similar in meaning¹⁵.

¹⁴ <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/jeffdec.html>

¹⁵ J.J. Rousseau, 1961: *Petits Chefs-d’Oeuvre*, Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et C^{ie}., Paris, p. 161.

Moreover, the fact that individuals may be required to give up on their personal welfare for some higher goal, opens up the possibility of countless abuse by politicians. If we have to choose between these two concepts, it becomes obvious that, eventually, public necessity has to be accepted as individual good as well.

Another reason why there is in fact no common good, is that society itself is fragmented, and there will always be conflicting interests of various social groups.

J.J. Rousseau also makes another distinction, that between the *general will* (quite similar in meaning to what is now the rule of law) and *everyone's will* (a sum of individual desires of several individuals). It seems clear though, that all these concepts are theoretical in nature, that their real-life implementation is utopian, and that a variety of factors undermine their credibility (among which the questionable competence and good intentions of political actors are paramount).

Freedom and equality also seem to contradict one another, since the very existence of freedom leads to inequality in all its forms (social, economic, cultural etc). As an illustration, the concept of free markets, which lies at the basis of capitalism, generates situations in which some companies survive while others go bankrupt. It therefore appears impossible to think of an ideal society where freedom and equality coexist.

Consequently, the obvious question that arises is: why do these concepts still exist? Why are they still invoked, why do people still react to them? It seems that these buzz-words impact on our collective subconscious, and that their emotional appeal is stronger than the rational one. Equality, freedom, welfare, the common good, all these ideal concepts ring a bell to our subconscious, and are widely used by politicians in elections campaigns, when they know they have to tell us what we want to hear, and when our desire to be deluded seems stronger than ever.

Concluding remarks

This first chapter has attempted to provide a conceptual framework for our subsequent analysis. We have discussed the notions of democracy and power and their implications, as well as some factors we believe are relevant for the study of political communication in democratic regimes. In the following sections, we shall go into more detail regarding propaganda, discourse strategies, the political promise, and the modern means of political communication.

1.5 PRACTICE FILE 1

Discuss the following extracts:

Example 1. “There are always individuals, and groups of people that manipulate others. Anyway, it is easier to manipulate a crowd than a limited group.”

(Lucian Boia, *Mitul democrației*, Editura Humanitas, 2003, p. 17);

Notes:

Example 2. “The sovereignty of the people is an abstract principle, something that does not exist in itself. It can be invoked for all purposes, good or bad. If required by the supreme interest of the nation, there is no such thing as a sacrifice too great”.

(Lucian Boia, *Mitul democrației*, Editura Humanitas, 2003, p. 19);

Notes:

Example 3. “On the one hand, politics is viewed as a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it. Some states are conspicuously based on struggles for power; whether democracies are essentially so constituted is disputable. On the other hand, politics is viewed as cooperation, as the practices and institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, influence, liberty and the like. Again, whether democracies are intrinsically so constituted is disputed.”

(Paul Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse, Theory and Practice*, London and New York, Routledge, 2006, p.3);

Notes:

Example 4. “And Hague *et al* cite Miller (1991:390), who says that the political process typically involves persuasion and bargaining. This line of reasoning leads to the need to explain how use of language can produce the effects of authority, legitimacy, consensus, and so forth that are recognized

as being intrinsic to politics. What is the role of force? What is the role of language?”

(Paul Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse, Theory and Practice*, London and New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 4);

Notes:

Example 5. “Using the word *to convince* means defining a change of opinion as a result of a joint process involving both speaker and listener, with equal status. There is no winner and no loser in this process. By contrast, *persuasion* is perceived as defeat, as confusion, as a bow in front of the other; it means an acknowledgement of the power of the other, who controls me because he influences me”.

(Jean-Noel Kapferer, *Căile persuasiunii, modul de influențare a comportamentelor prin mass-media și publicitate*, Editura comunicare.ro, București, 2002, p. 21);

Notes:

Example 6. “«Majority Tyranny» Threatens Liberty – James Madison and the other Founders of the American Republic feared that majority rule was bound to undermine freedom and threaten the rights of the individual. They created a constitutional system that was in fact designed to protect certain liberties against the unwelcome intrusions of the majority. The fears of the Founders were not without basis. What they called the «popular passions» have sometimes stifled the freedoms of groups and individuals who have dared to be different. Until quite recently, for instance, a majority of Americans were unwilling to allow atheists or communists the same rights of free speech that they allowed others, and conscientious objectors were treated harshly during both world wars. ”

(Edward S. Greenberg and Benjamin I. PAGE, Benjamin I., *The Struggle for Democracy*, Longman, New York, 1999, p. 12);

Notes:

Example 7. “The intimate connection between the nation’s wealth and founding ideals is expressed in the so-called American Dream, which holds that anyone who works hard can succeed in America. The country’s image as a land of opportunity has lured millions from abroad and buoyed the hopes of millions more already here. It is hardly surprising, then, that Americans have worried in recent years about the decline of the American Dream. Technological change and international competition have weakened the nation’s industrial base with the result that wages and income have stagnated. For the first time in history, young adults face the prospect of a standard of living below that of their parents.”

(Thomas E. Paterson, *The American Democracy*, The McGraw- Hill Companies, Inc., New York, 1996, p. 15);

Notes:

Example 8. “Power relations are always relations of *struggle*, using the term in a technical sense to refer to the process whereby social groupings with different interests engage with one another.”

(Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, Longman, London & New York, 1992, p. 34);

Notes:

Example 9. “In face-to-face interaction, participants alternate between being the producers and the interpreters of text, but in media discourse, as well as generally in writing, there is a sharp divide between producers and interpreters – or, since the media “product” takes on some of the nature of a commodity, between producers and «consumers».”

(Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, Longman, London & New York, 1992, p. 49);

Notes:

Example 10. “The reconfiguration of the democratic public space in the late 1980s springs from a multitude of factors, among which: the ever weaker

influence of national policies over the increasingly internationalized economy, the quasi-total end of communist regimes, the generalized political succession in liberal democracies and the ever more important role of television in political debates. The main result of this new context is the progressive deterioration of the representative democracies' fundamentals, undermined by the new forms of televisual mediation which favour the formation of a **democracy of opinions.**"

(Rosemarie Haineş, *Televiziunea și reconfigurarea politicului, Studiu de caz: alegerile prezidențiale din România din anii 1996 și 2000*, Editura Polirom, Iași, București, 2002, p. 61).

Notes:
